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Results for drug eradication

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Author: Fishstein, Paul

Title: A Little Bit Poppy-free and a Little Bit Eradicated: Opium poppy cultivation in Balkh and Badakhshan Provinces in 2011-2012

Summary: While Balkh and Badakhshan have very different geographical, social, political, and historical contexts, it is hard to identify any factors which could significantly reduce cultivation of opium poppy in either province in the foreseeable future. In Balkh, some of the coercive approaches which have reduced opium poppy cultivation are not sustainable in the longer-term, especially where they go against the economic conditions prevailing in the rural economy. In Badakhshan, a half-hearted coercion has produced uneven results. In the context of the 2014 security transition, it is an open question as to whether the Afghan government and its international partners, preoccupied with other issues (e.g., security, presidential elections), will have the motivation and the means to maintain unpopular coercive approaches, especially where they require the application of consistent pressure on local officials and communities which may have different agendas. Household-level field research done during May 2012 in farming communities in two districts in Balkh (Chimtal, Char Bolak) and Badakhshan (Jurm, Khash) which had a history of opium poppy cultivation, revealed very different dynamics within the opium economy. In Balkh, analysis confirmed the role of state presence and coercion in suppressing opium poppy cultivation as well as the correlation of cultivation with insecurity, with poppy concentrated in areas inaccessible to the government. Balkh has retained its “poppy-free” status, first obtained in 2007, while also raising questions about metrics, as little independent or verifiable information is available on the insecure areas in which poppy is grown. It is also possible that in Balkh causality runs in both directions, and that at least some of the insecurity in areas in which opium poppy is found is the result of stresses and grievances connected with the suppression of cultivation. Deployment of local police(who have informally come to be called arbaki) was credited with improving security and helping to maintain the suppression of cultivation; the population is not confident that this security effect will endure, however, and they have raised concerns about the role that the “arbaki” may play, including allegations of involvement in poppy cultivation. In Badakhshan, analysis connected the decision of households to cultivate poppy with their efforts to resolve financial stress (including debt and asset sales) brought on by the long and harsh winter of 2011-12, and, based on the previous year’s experience, the lack of a credible threat of eradication. Among surveyed households, the number who reported growing poppy doubled from the previous year and the area devoted to poppy increased from four to ten percent of total area sown. Unlike in Balkh, where there has been one dominant leader who has been both motivated and capable of suppressing cultivation in most areas of the province, in Badakhshan power has been more contested and fragmented among local commanders and power holders, who have shown little interest in reducing cultivation, trafficking, and other illicit activities. During 2012, Badakhshan was estimated to have had a 13 percent increase in cultivated area, which moved the province into being a “moderate” rather than “low” producer of opium poppy. Also, unlike Balkh where cultivation is largely limited to two districts, cultivation is widely dispersed across the province’s 26 districts. Given Badakhshan’s mountainous geography and highly contested space, the reporting (post-fieldwork) of apparently much more extensive eradication raises the question of whether the authorities are attempting to impose their will in a more aggressive way than previously and, if so, what the reaction of communities and local power holders will be. While farming conditions in the spring of 2012 were much more promising than the previous year, analysis confirmed the importance of off-farm income in household livelihoods. Labour opportunities and wages in Balkh, especially Mazar-e Sharif (the provincial centre of Balkh), were much more plentiful than during the previous drought year. Meanwhile, in Badakhshan labourers were struggling to find work due to the delay in the start of the construction season. In both provinces, farming households, labourers, and shopkeepers spoke longingly of the “good old days” when the economy was thriving due to opium production and trade. While Badakhshan continues to be considered a drug transit route, this activity does not generate the same widespread incomes as did the extensive cultivation of the mid-2000s. The vast majority of surveyed households in Badakhshan were calculated to be existing on US$2 per person per day, with only about one-quarter meeting their grain requirements from their own production. With the political and security situation now on an unknown trajectory, reductions in cultivation may be more difficult to achieve or maintain, especially in an unstable or contested environment. The enormous pressure on power holders and aspirants, already understood to be preparing for post-2014 instability, to conclude local deals in order to control an area or resources will reduce incentives to adhere to national policies where such policies run up against local interests. In Balkh, which has served as a successful model not just of elimination of opium poppy but also economic development under a strong provincial administration, the shifting of emphasis from Kabul and from the international community may reduce the sorts of political incentives that have until now made it worth imposing unpopular policies. The anticipated contraction in the national economy due to the withdrawal of international spending and reduction in local investor confidence may reduce both household livelihoods opportunities and sources of patronage for power holders. Finally, given the dependence of so many households on off-farm income, pressure to relax the suppression of cultivation may rise in proportion to the anticipated contraction of the economy and the reduction in opportunities for work-related migration in the region.

Details: Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2013. 67p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 6, 2013 at: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1305E%20Opium%20in%20Balkh%20and%20Badakhshan%20Case%20Study%20May%202013.pdf

Year: 2013

Country: Afghanistan

URL: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1305E%20Opium%20in%20Balkh%20and%20Badakhshan%20Case%20Study%20May%202013.pdf

Shelf Number: 128976

Keywords:
Drug Eradication
Illicit Drugs
Narcotics
Opiates (Afghanistan)
Opium Abuse
Opium Poppy Cultivation

Author: Buxton, Julia

Title: Drug Crop Production, Poverty, and Development

Summary: The cultivation of drug crops such as opium poppy, coca, and cannabis is a vital source of economic and physical security for poor, marginalized, and vulnerable communities in the Global South. International drug control strategies that have targeted cultivators with violent state coercion and eradication strategies have fueled displacement, ecological damage, and land poverty, while exacerbating existing problems of malnutrition and infectious disease. Such approaches have proved particularly counterproductive in conflict contexts, where an assumed nexus between drug revenues and the financing of terrorism and insurgency has undermined prospects for peace and stability. At its 20th session in 1998, the UNODC recognized that alternative development (AD) approaches could and should be used to reduce reliance on illicit cultivation by fostering livelihood opportunities in the formal economy. In the period since, AD has been rolled out in cultivation zones and evolved into more complex development interventions. However, rather than reducing global drug volumes, they have displaced cultivation into new areas and generated shifts in types of drug manufacture. In sum, they are doing more harm than good. Drawing together research from the AD experience of a diversity of countries and regions, Drug Crop Production, Poverty, and Development argues that AD programs cannot succeed in a broader context of the ongoing criminalization of cultivators and cultivation; UNODC use of inappropriate metrics; and poor AD program design, monitoring, and evaluation. AD programs continue to be chronically underfunded, poorly integrated into poverty reduction and development strategies and are usually conditional upon the prior eradication of crops. Effective responses to this supply side dynamic must recognize cultivation as a problem of development and security in complex and fragile environments, with new and evidence-based policies that acknowledge the role and value of these crops in distinct cultures and contexts.

Details: New York: Open Society Foundations, 2016. 20p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 31, 2016 at: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/drug-crop-production-poverty-and-development

Year: 2016

Country: International

URL: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/drug-crop-production-poverty-and-development

Shelf Number: 138515

Keywords:
Drug Control
Drug Enforcement
Drug Eradication
Drug Policy
Opium

Author: International Expert Group on Drug Policy Metrics

Title: Aligning Agendas: Drugs, Sustainable Development, and the Drive for Policy Coherence

Summary: Current drug policy too often has a negative impact on communities and runs counter to efforts to ameliorate poverty through sustainable development. However, this is often not captured by the metrics used to measure the impact of drug policy. One way to improve these metrics is to align them with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This would not only help overcome many of the limitations of drug policies resulting from suboptimal metrics but also make sure these policies enhance, rather than hinder, efforts to achieve the SDGs. This report analyzes how more precise, more complete, and better conceived metrics can help us to understand the impact of drug policy on sustainable development and the prospects of achieving the SDGs. The report is the result of over a year of work by the International Expert Group on Drug Policy Metrics, convened by the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum and the International Peace Institute. This group puts forward the following recommendations for the UN, member states, and the drug policy community: Develop a framework for policy coherence between drug policy and sustainable development. Create an external advisory committee bringing together experts on drug policy and sustainable development. Add SDG indicators related to drug policy. Put in place mechanisms to gather data on the effects of drug policies. Use the SDG indicators as a model for improving drug policy indicators. Prioritize outcome - rather than process-oriented metrics.

Details: New York: International Peace Institute, 2018. 28p.

Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 2, 2018 at: https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/1802_Aligning-Agendas.pdf

Year: 2018

Country: International

URL: https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/1802_Aligning-Agendas.pdf

Shelf Number: 149982

Keywords:
Developing Countries
Drug Control
Drug Eradication
Drug Policy
Drug Policy Reform